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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LlLLTA~

J11 0X.

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-v~.---·

HOS~

N. 'l,AYLOR,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF, APPELLANT

STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

This is a personal injury action. A jury trial resulted
in a verdict in favor of the defendant (R. 189). A motion
for new trial (R. 190) was overruled and denied (R. 191).
and thiH app~al follo\\·:-:.
On Septe1nber 30, 1958, at about 7:45 A.~L, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, ·was struck by an automobile driven by
the defendant. The accident occurred just as plaintiff
was stepping on the island in the center of Fifth South
bPtween Tenth and Eleventh East in Salt Lake Cit~T (R.
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22). The island separates the two lanes for east bound
traffic from the two lanes for west bound traffic. The
defendant was traveling east in the lane closest to the
island (R. 118). Plaintiff was on her way from the south
side of Fifth South to the north side of the west bound
traffic lane to reach an automobile which was waiting
for her at the entrance of Barbara Place to take her to
her place of employment. The area is shown by the diagram, Exhibit P 4, which is drawn to scale, and by the
photographs P 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Plaintiff, upon leaving her home on the west side of
Koneta Court, walked northerly to the south curb of
Fifth South (R. 32) where she observed defendant's automobile to the west near the Custom Furniture Store at
approximately three-fourths of a block away (R. 23-24).
The Custom Furniture Store is on the west side of Tenth
East, wbich street connects with the highway upon which
the accident occurred. The defendant had traveled north
on Tenth East to the vicinity of point 1 on the diagram
where he stopped for east bound traffic (R. 122), then
1nade a reverse right-hand turn onto the south lane of
the roadway (R. 83) where he continued southeasterly
to the point C 1 on the diagram (R. 84). Thereafter the
defendant turned onto the north lane for east bound
traffic and continued until the point of impact.
There is an unobstructed view to the east and southeast from the point where the defendant made the righthand turn from Tenth East, from which point there is a
gradual curve to the east and an uphill slope to the point
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the accident. When defendant made the right-hand
turn he was approximately 460 feet west of Koneta Court.
Plaintiff having seen defendant's automobile threefourths of a block away proceeded toward her destination.
Plaintiff was struck on her left buttock (R. 23) by
the left front fender of defendant's automobile (R. 117),
suffering crippling and painful injuries, including compound comminuted fractures of the left tibia and fibula
(R. 38-39, 45). Plaintiff was observed by the defendant,
immediately after the accident, to be laying "across the
island" (R. 112), "she was huddled up, I think with one
arm on the island and the remainder of her body possibly
one leg on the island, and the remainder of her body
on the curb of the island" (R. 115).
The width of the roadway at the point of impact for
east bound traffic is close to 31 feet. Defendant, according to his testiinony, was traveling from 3 to 4 feet frmu
the curb of the island (R. 117) upon which plaintiff was
stepping. There were no automobiles to the right of
defendant at the time of the accident (R. 117-118). The
defendant admitted that there was no reason why he
could not have turned to the right and onto the south lane
of the east bound traffic if he had seen the plaintiff 50
feet away (R. 118). He did not see plaintiff until he was
10 feet away from her, and when asked why he did not
see her sooner stated: "I think the glare on the windshield might have obscured my vision of her," but he said
that the glare did not obstruct his view of his lane of
traffic (R. 118). He testified that he was traveling beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

tween 20 and 25 miles an hour in second gear at the tune
of the collision (R. 119).
The defendant, a radio operator for Utah Highway
Patrol, was on his way to the University of Utah to attend an eight o'clock class. His work shift as radio operator was from eleven at night to seven in the morning.
On the morning in question it took the defendant -l-5
minutes from the time he left the Capitol Building to
arrive at the scene of the accident, during which interval
he drove to his home in the east 800 block on Fifth South,
had a shower and breakfast (R. 120). He disclaimed
being tired, weary or unobserving (R. 120).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED rPON
POINT I.
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LAST
CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GIVEN.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY.
POINT III.
BY IMPLICATION THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO PLAINTIFF'S PREJUDI·CE
THAT ALL SHE DID WAS TO MERELY GLANCE IN THE
DIRECTION OF THE APPROACHING VEHICLE.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LAST
CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GIVEN.

The requested instruction (R. 139-140), is in the
form suggested by instruction number 17.21 of J.I.F.r.
The refusal of the court to give the requested instruction
was excepted to (R. 128). It is appreciated that before
the trial Judge can be said to be in error for his refusal
to give the instruction it must appear from the evidence.
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, that
certain conditions exist. Among the conditions are that
the defendant, by exercising due care, would have discovered the plaintiff in a helpless position of danger, and
then, by exercising due care, should have realized the
danger to the plaintiff, and that he then had a clear
opportunity to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care and ''Tith his then existing ability.
In Winn 'L Read, 8 Utah 2d 394, 335 P.2d 627, the
plaintiff and defendant were traveling north on the highway, the plaintiff on a horse and defendant in his automobile. The trial court found that as the parties moved
northward in the san1e direction the plaintiff caused his
horse to move from the right-hand side of the road to the
left-hand side, had straightened out and then proceeded
parallel to the road for 30 rods when the accident occurred. The finding that the horseman had traveled for 30
f'()d:-: on the left-hand side of the road was not supported
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the evidence, but nevertheless this Court stated:
"If, as a matter of fact, the horseman, though
on the wrong side of the road, did travel for 30
rods, or any substantial diJstance, on the left-hand
side of the road, then the defendant should have
observed him and sho~tld have avoided running
into him. If he failed so to do, he was guilty of
negligence that was the sole proximate cause of
the collision." (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case the defendant should have observed the plaintiff crossing the roadway and should
have avoided running into her, even though, as a pedestrian, she might have been improperly crossing the roadway. The quotation taken from the W inn case is premised upon the supposition that the plaintiff traveled a
"substantial distance" on the wrong side of the road.
Here we have the plaintiff in the direct line of defendant's
vision from the time she left the south curb of Fifth
South until she was struck at the south curb of the island
in the center of the street. . A.s in the Winn case, the defendant should have observed plaintiff and should have
avoided running into her.
The defendant stated affinnatively that he did not
see the plaintiff until she was 10 feet away, until too
late for him to act. The defendant did not turn to the
right where there was mnple roon1, unobstructed by any
traffic, to pass her. A strikingly similar situation existed
in Beckstrom v. TV£lliams (1955), 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P.2d
309, where the trial court refused plaintiff's request to
submit the case to the jury on the theory of the last clear
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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chance. This ·Court held the refusal to have been erroneous and remanded the case with directions to grant a
new trial.
Also, as in the Beckstrom case, the plaintiff was in
danger from defendant's oncoming vehicle from which
she could not extricate herself as soon as she moved into
the lane of traffic then being traveled by defendant. In
the Beckstrom case the plaintiff had driven a 2¥2 ton
tractor fron1 a private driveway into the path of defendant's approaching vehicle that he saw about 325 feet away
approaching at a high rate of speed. The defendant continued forward without reducing his speed or changing
directions, striking the tractor broadside and causing the
injuries complained of. As to the rule governing the
giving of the requested instruction on the last clear
chance doctrine the Court said:
"In the present case the trial judge was bound
under this rule of law to give the requested instruction on last clear chance only if it appears
that reasonable men might conclude from the
evidence most favorable to plaintiff that three
conditions existed - (A) that plaintiff was in a
danger from which he could no longer extricate
himself, (B) that defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that
plaintiff was so endangered, and (C) that defendant thereafter, by exercise of reasonable ca:re,
could have avoided injuring the plaintiff."
Under proposition (A) the Court indicated various
situations apparent to "reasonable minds" which pointed
to the danger from which the plaintiff could not extriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eate himself, among which was the proposition "that
jumping to either side presented plaintiff no assurance
of safety." In the instant case the plaintiff was confronted by the same dilemma, i.e., in standing still, retreating or going forward. The danger would persist no
matter which course the plaintiff took. The happening
of the accident demonstrated that her forward movement
toward the safety of the island was disastrous. We submit that the requirement of condition (A) is apparent.
Under condition (B) it was reasoned that when the
tractor continued forward defendant was bound to know
that the driver of the cumbersome machine could not,
in the few seconds required for defendant's vehicle to
reach the spot, get out of the way and avoid an accident.
The same reasoning would apply in this case. The plaintiff was moving forward across the highway in full view
of defendant. Her forward movement implies that she
was unaware of the close proximity of defendant's vehicle. The defendant, in the exercise of due care, should
have known that plaintiff was not aware of the danger.
Being unaware of the danger plaintiff was helpless to
do anything in time to avoid the accident. The evidence
tnost favorable to plaintiff tends to show that defendant
on the other hand had ample opportunity to know of
plaintiff's helplessness had he been properly attentive.
The condition is satisfied under the rule of the Beckstrom
case if the evidence tends to show that the defendant,
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known
that plaintiff is endangered, leaving the ultilnate fact to
the jury under the proper instruction.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Certainly the driver of an automobile should be
aware of the frustrations that he occasions in others
under the circumstances that we have here. The jury
could have reasonably believed that the defendant saw,
or should have seen, the plaintiff when he was in the
south lane at point C 1, or when he thereafter turned
into the north lane, the lane nearest to the island. Point
C 1 is approximately 220 feet from the point of impact.
At some place between C 1 and the point of impact the
defendant made, or in the exercise of due care should
have made, an observation to the front and to the rear
to determine if he could safely move from one lane to
the other. He was either unobserving or else he deliberately calculated the risk of driving between plaintiff
·and the island. It could reasonably be said that defendant
should have seen the plaintiff, whether he was in the north
or south lane, within ample distance to permit him to stop
his vehicle.
In Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231, and
based upon figures frmn a publication by Utah State
Highway Patrol, the stopping distance for a vehicle
going 25 miles per hour, including reaction time, was
determined to be 62.5 feet. The defendant testified that
if he had seen the plaintiff 50 feet away he could have
turned to the right (R. 118).
Unlike the situation in Compton v. Ogden Union Ry.
& Depot Co., 120 Utah 453, 235 P.2d 515, the plaintiff was
unable "up to the moment of injury" to avoid the peril.
:\lis~ Fox c>ould not •·at any instant up to the time she
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was actually struck * * * by taking one step to the side,
have avoided her injury." In the Compton case the train
could only follow the course by which it was guided by
the rails-the plaintiff had a choice but not the engineer.
The solution of the predicament in the instant case was
with the defendant, the driver of the automobile, who, in
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that
plaintiff was in danger from which she could no longer
extricate herself, and who, by his own statement, could
have avoided the accident if he had seen her but 50 feet
away. It would be of the gravest public concern to condone the conduct of the defendant, who admits that on a
clear day and on an unobstructed highway he could not
see an object moving within his line of vision 50 feet
away and yet continued to move forward. The situation
in the instant case is even more shocking because plaintiff had crossed the entire south portion of the two-lane
roadway clear to the left side of defendant's car when
she was struck by the left front fender while defendant
was traveling at a speed not in excess, so he claims, of
25 miles per hour. Furthermore, defendant was free to
utilize the entire 20 foot lane for traffic at his right the lane in which he should have continued traveling from
the outset.
In rationalizing proposition (C), and again looking
at the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff on the propriety of the giving of the requested instruction, the Court in the Beckstrom case called attention to the fact that the highway was completely free of
other traffic; that the tractor cmne to a halt leaving some
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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16 feet of hard surface to the east which the defendant
could, as he could in the instant case, have "lawfully
utilized, turning out the three or four feet necessary to
miss the tractor, without any danger to himself or others.
Had defendant both braked and turned out for the tractor, the obvious and normal thing to have done, even
less chance of mishap would have existed." The Court
concluded:
"It is thus well within the ambit of reason
that the jury might believe defendant had ample
opportunity to avoid the collision after he should
have seen plaintiff's peril and realized that he
was helpless to escape. ***
"Whatever the true facts of the case, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff could justify reasonable men in concluding that plaintiff was in inextricable peril, that
defendant had sufficient reason to realize this fact
and that defendant thereafter clearly had opportunity to avoid the collision-the elements necessary for the application of the last clear chance
doctrine. Therefore the trial court erred in refusing to comply with its request to submit the
case to the jury on that theory."
We believe the instant case to be distinguishable
from the recent case of 1J1arcellin v. Osguthorpe (1959),
9 Utah 2d 1, 336 P .2d 779, which case, although adhering
to the expressions of this Court in Graham v. Johnson,
109 Utah 346, 166 P.2d 230, and Beckstrom v. Williams,
supra, on the doctrine of last clear chance, held that under the facts the defendant could do nothing to avert the
collision "because his action by dimming his lights eould
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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only react through the plaintiff" and "It would have required unusual perspicacity, if not outright prescience,
for the defendant to have presaged that an accident of
this character was going to happen on the basis of a
quick analysis of the factors involved." It was held that
conjectures to the extent indicated did not satisfy "the
requirement of last clear chance because it must exist
with at least reasonable certainty."
In the Marcellin case the plaintiff was driving his
vehicle west before daylight and sideswiped the rear end
of an automobile ·that was stalled on the right-hand side.
of the road going west. Defendant going east had stopped on his right-hand side of the road to render assistance to the stalled car. There was ample room between
the two cars for plaintiff to travel, but it was contended
that defendant had left his headlights on high beam so
that plaintiff was unable to see the stalled car until it
was too late for him to avoid the collision. The contention was that defendant could have dimmed his lights
when he saw plaintiff approaching, thus enabling plaintiff to see the lighted taillights of the stalled automobile.
In the instant case the setting is entirely different
and the defendant, in the exercise of due care, could have
seen the plaintiff on the highway in ample time to avoid
the collision.
To say that plaintiff was negligent within the last
clear chance doctrine is being charitable to the defendant.
Fr01n all indications defendant actually pursued plaintiff to the curb of the island and knocked her down. ReSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
fleeting upon the record, including the photographs and
the diagram, it is little wonder that plaintiff, notwithstanding the shock of the impact, asked the defendant
within five minutes of the accident: "Why did you hit
me1 ***you swerved to hit me." (R. 116).
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY.

Instruction 13 (R. 180) delineates the rules of law
governing plaintiff's conduct "in order not to be guilty
herself of contributory negligence." The instruction
consists of two pages, which are out of place in the record,
the first page being 180 and the second page being 167.
The exceptions appear at pages 127-128. Subsection (2)
states:
" ( 2) A pedestrian who crosses a street at a
point other than within a marked crosswalk or
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection
shall yield the r~ght of way to all vehicles upon
the roadway." (Emphasis added.)
The last paragraph of the instruction (R. 167) would
require the jury to render a verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, if it
found that plaintiff failed to observe subsection (2) and
that he'r failure proximately contributed to the happening of the collision. The instruction ignores the reciprocal duty of the defendant as required by subsection (a)
of Section 41-6-80, U.C.A.. 1953, which reads:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of
this act every driver of a vehicle shall exercise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian
upon any roadway and shall give warning by
sounding the horn when necessary and shall exercise proper precaution upon observing any child
or any incapacitated person upon a roadway."
The above section follows Section 41-6-79, U.C.A. 1953,
and qualifies subsection (a) thereof, which reads :
"Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any
point other than within a marked crosswalk or
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection
shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon
the roadway."
The instruction is inconsistent with Instruction 6
(R.173), which reads:
"The rights of a pedestrian to the use of
public streets are the same as those of motoristsneither greater nor less, and the same general
duties devolve upon them.''
Subsection ( 3) of Instruction 13 is inconsistent with
subsection (2). Subsection (3) states:
"(3) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any
point other than within a marked crosswalk or
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection
is required to exercise more care and cm.dion tha·u
'lDOuld be requi'red in crossing in a pedestrian Ian~
or within an un1narked crosswalk at an intersertion." (E1nphasis added.)
The instructions reflect the law of the case from
which the jury cannot deviate. By Instrurtion 7 (R. 17 -+)
the jn ry wa:-; told :
"Th~

law ilnposes upon

th~

driver of any

YP-
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hicle using a public highway, and upon a pedestrian, the same duty, each to exercise ordinary
care to avoid causing an accident from which injury might result. The pedestrian's duty includes
exercising ordinary care to avoid placing herself
or others in danger. The driver's duty requires
him to be vigilant at all times, keeping a lookout
for traffic and other conditions reasonably to be
anticipated, and to keep the vehicle under such
control that, to avoid a collision with any person
or with any other object, he can stop as quickly
as might be required of him by conditions that
would be anticipated by an ordinary, prudent
driver in like position.

Each of these duties continues even when
one has the nyht-of-way over the other." (Emphasis added.)
In taking the exceptions the inconsistencies as pointed out above were expressly stated, except that InstruCtion 7 was not specifically mentioned. It is plain, nevertheless, that the inconsistency of Instruction 7 is inherent
in the matters to which attention was specifically called.
But be that as it may, the instruction overlooks the realities of the situation as graphically described by this
Court in Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680:
"Even if a car is seen approaching, unless it
is so positioned as to constitute an immediate
hazard to her, she is not necessarily obliged to
focus full and undivided attention on that particular car and so calculates her entire conduct as to
avoid being struck by it. She need not anticipate
that the driver will speed, fail to observe, or to
control his car, or fail to afford her the right of
way, or otherwise be negligent unless in due care
she observes or should observe something to warn
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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her of such improper conduct. This is not to say
that a pedestrian may claim a right-of-way in
face of danger. She must of course be watching
for automobiles or other vehicles on the street,
particularly from the north whence traffic wa;
most likely to come. But due care requires that
she also keep a lookout ahead for other pedestrians, possible holes or obstructions in the street,
and at least remain aware of the possibility of
other traffic, lest she be guilty of failing to use
reasonable care for her own safety in regard to
other dangers. For these reasons she obviously
is not necessarily required, and likely in due care
cannot, give her entire attention to any one particular point of hazard. All that is required of
her is that she use that degree of care which ordinary and reasonable persons usually observe under such circumstances."
To say that a pedestrian who crosses a street at a
point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the
right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway, and that
if the failure to so yield proximately contributes to the
happening of the collision is to overly simplify the rule,
and would ordinarily mean that a pedestrian venture~
upon a public street at his peril, or that he must flee at
the sight of an approaching vehicle regardless of it~
relative position on the highway. The meaning thus
attributed to the instruction is reiterated and given further impetus, if possible, by Instruction 14 (R. 181)~
which instructs that even though the defendant was driYing too fast for existing conditions or even though he
failed to keep a proper lookout the plaintiff is barred
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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frorn recovery if "she failed to yield the right-of-way to
the defendant's automobile" and such failure was a proximate contributing cause of the accident. We submit that
the use of the expression "failed to yield the right-ofway" wiJthout more is an erroneous statement of conduct
upon which to predicate negligence. The jury, if not
thoroughly confused by the other and conflicting stateInents as pointed out, was most certainly uninstructed on
the right-of-way rule and the reciprocal duty of the defendant, all to the obvious prejudice of the plaintiff.
POINT III.
BY IMPLICATION THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO PLAINTIFF'S PREJUDI·CE
THAT ALL SHE DID WAS TO MERELY GLANCE IN THE
DIRECTION OF THE APPROACHING VEHICLE.

By subparagraph (1) of Instruction 13 (R. 180) the
jury was instructed that it was the duty of the plaintiff in undertaking to cross the street to keep a reasonable
and adequate lookout for automobiles using the street
and to use reasonable and ordinary care to keep out of
the way of such automobiles, and that it was her duty to
look and observe whether there were any automobiles
in such close proximity as to affect her safety and to
continue to keep such a reasonable and prudent lookout
as is reasonably necessary for her own protection. The
court then made the gratuitious statement to the effect
that such would be true even though a pedestrian is in a
pedestrian lane and may have the right-of-way over the
motor vehicle. The instruction then states :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"In this connection a mere glance in the di·rection of the approaching automobile is not sufficient. The duty to look has inherent in it the
duty to see what is there to be seen and to pay
heed to it." (Emphasis added.)
The exception to the instruction was that it "would
seem to inject into the case the fact that all plaintiff did
was merely glance in the direction of the approaching
automobile, which the evidence does not justify;" (R.
128). The trial judge was fully aware of the line of
demarcation between his prerogative and that of the
jury, such is indicated by the expression in Instruction 1
(R. 168):
"The court has no opinion, and does not seek
to express any in these instructions with respect
to what the facts are. It is your sole prerogative
to determine the facts from the evidence."
The error complained of was invited by defendant':'
requested Instruction 9 (R. 150), ·which cites lllingus 1.
Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495, in which case a
directed verdict in favor of the defendant was sustained
in a wrongful death action. The ·Court held that the
evidence showed that the deceased did not look and
neither said nor did anything to indicate that he 'vas at
all aware of the danger presented by defendant's approaching auton1obile; he did nothing to either warn hi~
wife nor to rescue either himself or her from their position of peril. "On this evidence, it must be said as a
matter of law that deceased either failed to look, or having looked, failed to see what he should have seen." The
Court then said:
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"The rights of pedestrians to the use of the
public streets are the same as those of motoristsneither greater or less. Hence, the same general
duties devolve upon them. A pedestrian crossing
a public street in a crosswalk or pedestrian lante,
although he may have the right of way over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent neglected
that duty in this case. It follows that he was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Of
course we do not mean to imply that a mere glance
in the direction of the approaching automobile
would suffice. The duty to look has inherent in it
the duty to see what is there to be seen, and to pay
heed to it." (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar the trial court reviewed the evidence on defendant's motion for directed verdict an:l
denied the same (R. 124), holding in effect that plaintiff did more than to merely glance in the direction of
the approaching automobile, assuming that the expression in the Mingus case, italicized above, can be distorted
into the positive assertion now claimed for it. Once
the court had determined that the evidence, as a matter
of law, did not entitle the defendant to a judgment, we
submit that the trial court could not, in its instruction,
presume to criticize plaintiff's alleged conduct without
giving the appearance of emphasizing what it thought to
be the evidence, and thus encroaching upon the prerogative of the jury. Furthermore, the expressions of this
Court in Coombs v. Perry, supra, seem to disavow the
refinement that the instruction makes.
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pects of due ca:re, or the lack of it, should he passed upon
by the jury under a general verdict, then the jury, and
not the court, had the sole right to determine the facts
and what was reasonable under the circumstances. The
expression that "a mere glance," as used in the instruction, bears the connotation that that is all the plaintiff
did and the prejudice is obvious.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

The motion for new trial (R. 190) ''ras on the following grounds :
'"1.

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify tlw
verdict.

2.

That the verdict of the jury is against law.

3.

Error in law occurring at the trial, including
errors in the giving of instructions excepted
to and errors in the failure to give requested
instructions, the refusal of which was likewise excepted to."

Aside from the errors heretofore pointed out, the
trial court, on the motion for new trial, was given the
opportunity to determine whether the evidence was suf- /
ficient to support the verdict, which involves, for the
purpose of our discussion, consideration of defendant's
negligence as being the sole proximate cause of the aecident.
The undisputed testilnony burdens defendant ·with
the duty of exercising due care to avoid eolliding with
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plaintiff even though she was crossing the roadway other
than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked
crosswalk at an intersection. Plaintiff had traveled the
entire width of the south lane for east bound traffic,
the lane in which defendant should have been traveling,
in the exercise of due care, and from which he turned
into the north lane to continue his eastward movement.
At the time he turned from the south lane to the north
lane he should, in the exercise of due care, have seen
the plaintiff. He did not see the plaintiff until she was
"10 feet away" and from the time he saw her plaintiff
traveled directly in front of him fl. distance of at least
the width of his automobile, and, according to his version,
an additional 10 feet in order to reach the point where
she was struck by the left front fender of defendant's
automobile. The accident was caused by defendant's
failure, in the exercise of due ca;re, to have seen the plaintiff sooner than he did, even though she was in plain
view.
The testimony of defendant that when he first saw
plaintiff she was 10 feet to the right of the front of his
car is incredible when one considers that defendant was
traveling between 20 and 25 miles per hour and that,
within the split second of time that must have elapsed
between the moment defendant saw the plaintiff and
the moment of the impact, plaintiff traveled the required
distance to place her in a position to be struck by the
left front fender. Regardless of the apparent improbability of defendant's version of when he first saw the
plaintiff, it was obvious that, in the exercise of due care,
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he should have seen her sooner. As was said in Coombr;

v. Perry, supra, the defendant must be deemed to have
seen her, the Court stating:
"It should be borne in mind that when defendant was such distance away, the plaintiff was in
the middle of the street, clearly within the angle
of vision of where the defendant should have been
looking, and he was obliged to know that her only
purpose in being theTe facing west was to cr--oss
the street. The 'must be deemed to have seen what
was there to be seen' rule also applies to the defendant; so he must be deemed to have seen her.
When she stepped forward west of the center line
it would be an immediate warning to him that she
was continuing to cross and that she claimed her
right-of-way. It therefore seems so plain as to be
beyond question that from the distances just postulated, as they reasonably could have been found
by the jury, the defendant had ample opportunity
to not only safely, but conveniently, slow down,
turn to his 'right, or stop if necessary, to afford
the plaintiff the right-of-way and avoid striking
her."
The occurrence of the accident cannot be rationalized on any premise other than the defendant's failure
to comply with his continuing duty to keep a proper
lookout regardless of plaintiff's position on the street.
As the direct result of defendant's carelessness the accident happened whether plaintiff saw hiln or not, and consequently her alleged failure to see did not proximately
contribute to the cause of the accident. Again we quote
from Coombs r. Perry, supra:
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·•*** that if the plaintiff had looked and seen
defendant approaching at a distance of 1-l--1 feet
or more away, due care would not have required
her to do anything other than to proceed forward
on the assumption that defendant would afford
her the right of way; and that thus her conduct
could have been the same, and the accident could
have happened just the same, whether she saw
him or not; and consequently that her failure to
see did not proximately contribute to cause the
accident. This would be true without the testiInony of the witness Burns hereinabove referred
to, but if we consider the additional fact that he
said the defendant was not proceeding in the
center lane, but in the west lane, and that as he
approached the plaintiff in the crosswalk, he
swerved to his left and toward her, it is made
palpably clea;r."
The refinements of proximate cause, the sole proxin1ate cause and what may have proximately contributed
to the happening of the collision have been expressed
1nany times by this Court. The application of those rules
vary with each set of facts. In Winn v. Read, supra,
it was said that if the horseman, though on the wrong
side of the road, had traveled for any substantial distance, the defendant motorist should have observed him
and should have avoided running into him. "If he failed
so to do he was guilty of negligence that was the sole
proximate cause of the collision." The simplicity of the
statement and the realistic application of the principle
merits emphasis.
We submit that the relative position of defendant's
automobile and the position of the plaintiff at the time
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of the impact, coupled with defendant's statement that
he did not see that which he should have seen under all
of the circumstances, compels the finding, by the tests
enumerated by this ·Court, that defendant was responsible
for the collision, due solely to his failure to keep a lookout that he was under obligation to keep. The evidence
is insufficient to support the verdict in defendant's favor.
CONCLUSION
The jury, in the conscientious performance of its
duty to accept without question the instructions of the
trial court, was impelled by Instructions 13 and 14 to
ignore the conduct of the defendant and to give effect to
the erroneous connotation of the expression "to yield
the right-of-way." The overly simplified admonition
annihilated plaintiff's position as completely as if a
verdict had been directed against her. Plaintiff was entitled to have her cause submitted to the jury by clear.
unequivocal and correct statements of the law governing
. the conduct of both parties, free from any expression
from which it 1night be said that the trial court had predetermined any fact, the detern1ination of which it was,
nevertheless, leaving to the jury.
The inexcusable eonduct of the

def~ndant

driver,

who admits that he did not see the plaintiff, a pedestrian,
on an

otherwis~ unoh~tructed

hig-hway in broad daylight.
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until he was 10 feet away from her, should be condemned.
The plaintiff is fairly entitled to have a jury, properly
instructed, pass upon the opportunity that the defendant
had to avoid the accident under the circumstances pointed
out above.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and
the cause remanded with such instructions as to this
Court may seem proper.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON
Attorneys for Plaimtiff and .Appellant
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